1	INTERD CENTED MACTOEDAEL COURT		
1	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE COURT		
2	FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
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5	AUDATEX NORTH AMERICA, INC.,		
6			
7	PLAINTIFF, . NO. 13-CV-1523		
8	V JANUARY 29, 201	L5	
9	MITCHELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., . 10:24 A.M.		
10	DEFENDANT SAN DIEGO, CAL	IFORNIA	
11			
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13	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE BARBARA LYNN MAJOR		
14	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE		
15	APPEARANCES:		
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17			
18	BY: PATRICK MCGILL, ESQ.	BY: DAVID C. MCPHIE, ESQ. BY: PATRICK MCGILL, ESQ.	
19	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	840 NEWPORT CENTER DR, STE. 400 NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA 92660	
20	FOR THE DEFENDANT: MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS,	MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP	
21	BY: JASON C. WHITE, ESQ.	BY: JASON C. WHITE, ESQ. 77 WEST WACKER DRIVE, SUITE 500	
22	CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601		
		CCD	
23	333 W. BROADWAY, SUITE 42	0	
24	SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, 92	101	
25	PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDINGS		

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, JANUARY 29, 2015, 10:24 A.M. 1 2 3 THE CLERK: FOR THE RECORD, ITEM NO. 2, 4 13-CV-1523-BEN-BLM, AUDALEX NORTH AMERICA, INC. VS. MITCHELL 5 INTERNATIONAL, INC., ON FOR MOTION HEARING. 6 PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEARANCES FOR THE RECORD. 7 MR. MCPHIE: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. DAVID MCPHIE, 8 9 WITH AUDALEX. THE COURT: THANK YOU. 10 MR. MCGILL: PATRICK MCGILL. 11 THE COURT: YOU'RE NOT ON MY CALENDAR. 12 MR. WHITE: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. JASON WHITE, 13 14 FOR MITCHELL. THE COURT: AND YOU ALSO ARE NOT ON MY CALENDAR. 15 OKAY. HAVE A SEAT, GENTLEMEN. I SET THIS FOR A HEARING, 16 RATHER THAN ISSUING A WRITTEN ORDER, BECAUSE I AM VERY 17 CONCERNED ABOUT THE LARGE NUMBER OF DISCOVERY DISPUTES THAT THE 18 19 PARTIES ARE HAVING AND THE FACT THAT YOU ARE HAVING THEM SO CLOSE TO THE CLOSE OF DISCOVERY. 20 WHEN I STARTED LOOKING AT ALL THE DISPUTES THAT THE 21 22 PARTIES HAVE, I DECIDED THAT THE FASTEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT WAY TO GET THE RULING TO YOU WAS TO HAVE EVERYBODY 23 COME IN AND ISSUE MY RULINGS ORALLY. I WILL BE ISSUING A 24 25 WRITTEN ORDER AFTER THIS HEARING, BUT IT'S GOING TO JUST STATE

WHETHER I GRANT IT OR DENY MOTIONS. THE REASONING I'M GOING TO 1 SET FORTH RIGHT NOW. I DO NOT NEED ORAL ARGUMENTS ON THE VAST 2 MAJORITY OF THESE MOTIONS. THEY WERE PRETTY STRAIGHTFORWARD. 3 THEY WERE WELL BRIEFED. BUT AS I SAID, I'M DOING THIS VERBALLY 4 BECAUSE IT'S THE FASTEST WAY TO GET THE RULINGS TO THE PARTIES, 5 AND YOU NEED TO GET FACT DISCOVERY COMPLETED AND MOVE INTO 6 EXPERT DISCOVERY. 7 FOR THE RECORD, I HAVE READ ALL OF THE PLEADINGS THAT THE 8 9 PARTIES SUBMITTED AND I'VE REVIEWED AND READ ALL OF THE RELEVANT EXHIBITS, INCLUDING THE ONES THAT ARE UNDER SEAL. 10 OKAY, I'M NOT GOING TO RESTATE ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS. YOU GUYS 11 KNOW WHAT YOUR ARGUMENTS ARE. I'M GOING TO GET RIGHT INTO THE 12 LAW AND THE RULINGS. 13 14 SO THE FIRST MOTION IS MITCHELL'S MOTION TO DEPOSE ATTORNEY BEN YORKS. THEY DO IT ON THE HOPES OF OBTAINING 15 EVIDENCE REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT. 16 INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IS THE DEFENSE, AS THE FED CIRCUIT IN 17 AMERICAN CAL CAR, INC. VS. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, 651 18 19 F.3D 1318, AT 1334, STATED TO PROVE, QUOTE, TO PROVE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT, THE ACCUSED INFRINGER MUST PROVIDE 20 EVIDENCE THAT THE APPLICANT, ONE, MISREPRESENTED OR OMITTED 21 MATERIAL INFORMATION; AND TWO, DID SO WITH A SPECIFIC INTENT TO 22 DECEIVE THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLOSED QUOTES. 23 GENERALLY, THE MATERIALITY THAT IS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH 24

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IS "BUT FOR," THAT IS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER

PRIOR ART THAT AN APPLICANT FAILS TO DISCLOSE TO THE PATENT AND 1 TRADEMARK OFFICE IS A "BUT FOR" REASON THAT THE CLAIM WOULD 2 HAVE BEEN ALLOWED BUT FOR THE UNDISCLOSED PRIOR ART. 3 THE FED CIRCUIT IN 2000 -- OR IN THAT CASE, CITING A 2010 4 CASE, STATED THAT IN A CASE INVOLVING NONDISCLOSURE OF 5 INFORMATION, CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE MUST SHOW THAT THE 6 APPLICANT MADE THE DELIBERATE DECISION TO WITHHOLD A KNOWN 7 MATERIAL REFERENCE, AND IN REACHING THIS DECISION, THE 8 9 TESTIMONY OF THE INVENTORS AND THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ARE RELEVANT. 10 IN THIS CASE, OBVIOUSLY, MR. YORKS WAS THE PROSECUTING 11 ATTORNEY, AND THAT IS THE REASON THAT MITCHELL WANTS TO DEPOSE 12 HIM. I HAVE TO SAY, I HAVE SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THIS BECAUSE 13 14 MITCHELL HAS NOT ALLEGED THIS DEFENSE, AND WE ARE AT THE CLOSE OF FACT DISCOVERY. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE LAW SET FORTH BY THE FED 15 CIRCUIT, I DO BELIEVE THAT MITCHELL HAS A RIGHT TO DEPOSE HIM. 16 I FIND, HOWEVER, THAT THE SCOPE OF THE DEPOSITION NEEDS TO BE 17 LIMITED. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUES RAISED BY AUDALEX 18 19 REGARDING MR. YORKS' CURRENT INVOLVEMENT IN RELATED LITIGATION OR RELATED PROCEEDINGS IN FRONT OF THE PTO. 20 21 WHAT I INTEND TO DO IS LIMIT THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY TO 22 ISSUES RELATING TO THE PRIOR ART REFERENCES THAT WERE CITED OR ALLEGEDLY NOT CITED IN THE ORIGINAL APPLICATIONS FOR THE 23 PATENT-IN-SUIT AND DURING THE ORIGINAL U.S. PTO PROCEEDINGS. 24

WE'RE NOT GOING BEYOND THAT. SO I WANT THIS LIMITED TO THAT

TIME FRAME AND INFORMATION REGARDING PRIOR ART THAT WAS EITHER 1 CITED OR NOT CITED. 2 I HAD A QUESTION. I SAW THAT TANYA WILKINS WAS BEING 3 DEPOSED EARLIER THIS WEEK, OR LAST WEEK ON THIS ISSUE, AS 4 AUDALEX'S 30(B)(6) WITNESS. WHAT HAPPENED WITH THAT 5 DEPOSITION? 6 MR. MCPHIE: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY? 7 THE COURT: YES. 8 9 MR. MCPHIE: OUR WITNESS IN FACT PROVIDED TESTIMONY ON THIS VERY ISSUE AND DISCLOSED THE ANSWER. AND THE REASON 10 THE NONDISCLOSURE -- OR THE ALLEGED NONDISCLOSURE IS PART OF 11 THAT 30(B)(6) TESTIMONY. AND I HAVE THAT HERE. WE ONLY -- WE 12 DIDN'T HAVE THE TRANSCRIPT. I CAN TELL YOU WHAT SHE SAID. 13 14 THE COURT: DID SHE IDENTIFY PRIOR ART THAT WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE PTO AND REASONS FOR IT? 15 MR. MCPHIE: YEAH. SO OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE 16 PRIMARY PRIOR ART THAT MITCHELL IS CONCERNED ABOUT HAS TO DO 17 WITH MITCHELL'S PRIOR ART PRODUCTS THAT WERE AVAILABLE BEFORE 18 19 THE FILING OF THE INITIAL PATENT APPLICATION. THERE IS A PRODUCT CALLED "FIRST ESTIMATE" AND A PRODUCT CALLED "IN 20 21 TOTAL." AT THE DEPOSITION, MITCHELL ASKED AUDATEX 30(B)(6) WITNESS, CAN YOU TELL ME WHY AUDATEX DID NOT DISCLOSE THE FIRST 22 ESTIMATE PRODUCT TO THE PATENT OFFICE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 23 PATENTS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE. SHE FIRST STATED SHE DIDN'T 24

HAVE FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE, BUT SHE HAD BEEN EDUCATED, AND SHE

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SAID -- IN SPEAKING WITH HIM ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON AT THE TIME, THEY SAID THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW THAT CERTAIN PRODUCTS EVEN EXISTED. THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE PRODUCTS LIKE FIRST ESTIMATE THAT ONLY HANDLED ESTIMATING AND DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE TOTAL LOST. SO, THEREFORE, IT'S NOT RELEVANT. AND I BELIEVE THAT THE PATENT ITSELF LISTS SOME REFERENCES OF THINGS THAT OUR -- THAT OUR PROCESS DID VET OUT TO SAY HERE ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF THINGS THAT WE FOUND THAT WE DON'T DO, THAT THEY ARE THE SAME THING AS WHAT WE ARE INVENTING, BUT THIS IS WHAT WE FOUND IN OUR SEARCH. I THINK THERE ARE SEVERAL EXAMPLES LISTED THERE. AND SO THAT IS THE TESTIMONY, AND IT GOES ON FOR A FEW MORE PAGES ABOUT THAT REFERENCE. THE POINT MADE OR FOLLOWING THAT, NO. 1, THAT MANY OF THE INVENTORS WEREN'T AWARE OF THE REFERENCE; 2, THE ONES THAT DID HAVE AN AWARENESS OF THE REFERENCE DID NOT KNOW IN DETAIL HOW IT OPERATED; THREE, THAT THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATION OF THE REFERENCE WAS THAT IT WAS LIMITED TO A PARTIAL LOSS, ESTIMATING ESTIMATE, AND NOT A TOTAL LOSS SYSTEM, WHICH IS WHAT -- HIS EMBODIMENT PATENT IN THIS CASE. AND FINALLY THAT THERE WERE, IN FACT, A NUMBER OF OTHER REFERENCES THAT DISCLOSE WEB-BASED PARTIAL LOSS REFERENCES THAT WERE, IN FACT, CONSIDERED BY THE PATENT OFFICE. IN OTHER WORDS, THESE OTHER REFERENCES, EVEN TO THE EXTENT THEY WERE RELEVANT, WERE CUMULATIVE.

THE COURT: OKAY. MITCHELL, ANYTHING YOU'D --

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MR. WHITE: YES. SO WE DID ASK HER THOSE QUESTIONS. BUT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INVENTORS KNEW ABOUT THEM, THESE SYSTEMS ARE DESCRIBED AS SEVERAL DOCUMENTS, MULTIPLE DOCUMENTS. SO I DON'T THINK -- I DON'T THINK THAT THAT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE PLAINTIFFS DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT THEM. WE ALSO DON'T KNOW WHAT OTHER SYSTEMS MAY HAVE OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DISCLOSED TO THE ATTORNEYS. SO WE KNOW A LITTLE BIT FROM SOME OF THE INVENTORS. WE HAVEN'T TALKED ABOUT ALL OF THEM YET, WHAT INFORMATION FROM THE INVENTORS TO THE LAWYERS. LAWYERS ACT AS SORT OF A STOP GAP IN PRESENTING FROM THE PATENT OFFICE. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT INFORMATION ENDED WITH THE LAWYER. WE KNOW THE SYSTEMS WERE NOT DISCLOSED TO THE PATENT OFFICE, AND THERE CAN BE OTHER THINGS THAT WERE DISCLOSED TO LAWYERS THAT WERE NOT DISCLOSED TO THE PATENT OFFICE. SO WE WANT TO EXPLORE. WE NARROWED IT TO THE -- NO OTHER ISSUES BEYOND THE SCOPE YOU SUGGESTED. BUT WE THINK WE HAVE TO ASK THOSE QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN ISSUE HERE. THE COURT: OKAY. MR. WHITE: AND WITH RESPECT TO THE PLEADINGS, WE HAVEN'T DONE -- BECAUSE IT'S A FRAUD AND HIGH STANDARD, WE DIDN'T WANT TO -- (INAUDIBLE). THE COURT: BUT YOU'RE WAY LATE TO BE GETTING A DEPOSITION IN THE HOPES OF -- I THINK THERE IS LEGITIMATE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER EVEN IF YOU FOUND OUT EVIDENCE OF IT,

WHETHER YOU CAN AMEND THIS LATE IN THE GAME. 1 MR. WHITE: BUT DEFINITELY BRINGING THAT MOTION, 2 EVERYTHING IS DELAYED. YOU CAN TALK ABOUT THIS --3 THE COURT: NO, NO. SO I -- BECAUSE THE FED CIRCUIT 4 HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN CONSIDERING INEOUITABLE CONDUCT 5 DEFENSE, THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE INVENTORS AND THE 6 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ARE RELEVANT, I AM GRANTING MITCHELL'S 7 MOTION TO DEPOSE MR. YORKS. BUT I AM LIMITING THAT VERY 8 9 SIGNIFICANTLY ONLY TO ISSUES RELATING TO PRIOR ART, INFORMATION THAT HE HAD REGARDING PRIOR ART AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION 10 AND IN THE INITIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FRONT OF THE PATENT OFFICE. 11 WE'RE NOT GOING BEYOND THAT SCOPE. DO YOU UNDERSTAND, COUNSEL? 12 MR. WHITE: YES, YOUR HONOR. 13 14 THE COURT: OKAY. THE SECOND ISSUE IS MITCHELL'S MOTION TO DEPOSE ANTHONY AQUILA. AM I SAYING THAT RIGHT, 15 "AOUILA"? 16 MR. WHITE: I BELIEVE IT IS "AQUILA." 17 THE COURT: THANK YOU. ANTHONY AQUILA, HE'S THE 18 19 FOUNDER, PRESIDENT, AND CEO OF SOLERA HOLDINGS. AUDATEX IS OPPOSED BECAUSE HE'S AN APEX WITNESS. AND MITCHELL SET FORTH A 20 NUMBER OF BASES ON WHICH THEY WANT TO DEPOSE HIM. INITIALLY, I 21 WANT TO SAY THAT MR. AQUILA'S DECISION TO SWITCH JOBS AND LEAVE 22 MITCHELL, THEN EITHER CREATE OR JOIN SOLERA MORE THAN TEN YEARS 23 AGO OR ABOUT TEN YEARS AGO IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES IN THE 24 INSTANT LITIGATION. 25

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I UNDERSTAND MITCHELL'S ARGUMENT AS TO WHY THEY THINK IT'S RELEVANT, AND I STRONGLY DISAGREE. I FOUND THAT EVEN UNDER THE BROAD DISCOVERY STANDARD THAT IS APPLICABLE, THAT THAT ISSUE IS VERY SPECULATIVE. EVEN MITCHELL SAYS THAT IT MAY LEAD TO THE DISCOVERY OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, AND DISCOVERY CLOSES TOMORROW. IT'S NOT GOING TO LEAD TO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. ON THAT ISSUE, I DENY IT BECAUSE IT'S IRRELEVANT. ON THE NEXT ISSUE, ALL OF THE OTHER THINGS THEY WANTED TO ASK HIM ABOUT, I FIND THAT HE IS AN APEX WITNESS. I DON'T FIND THAT'S EVEN CLOSE. I FIND THAT THAT STATUS HAS EASILY BEEN ESTABLISHED. I DID REVIEW HIS -- ALL OF THE INFORMATION ON THAT. SO ONCE I DETERMINED THAT HE IS AN APEX WITNESS, THEN THE QUESTION IS, WHETHER HE CAN BE DEPOSED. AND THE COURTS HAVE TRADITIONALLY STATED THAT IN DECIDING WHETHER TO ALLOW AN APEX DEPOSITION, COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THE HIGH LEVEL DEPONENT HAS UNIQUE, NONCUMULATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AT ISSUE; AND TWO, WHETHER THERE ARE OTHER LESS BURDENSOME METHODS. LET'S SEE, CITING WEBSITE STORY, INC. VS. NETRATINGS, INC., 2007 WESTLAW 1120567, AT 2, PAGE 2, AND SOLARCITY, INC. VS. ULTRA CLEAN HOLDING, A 2007 CASE, OUT OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. AND THE COURTS HAVE STATED THAT WHEN A HIGH LEVEL CORPORATE EXECUTIVE LACKS UNIQUE OR SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS IN DISPUTE, COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT GOOD CAUSE EXISTS TO PROHIBIT THE DEPOSITION. THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO WHEN THE

INFORMATION SOUGHT IN THE DEPOSITION CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH 1 LESS INTRUSIVE DISCOVERY METHODS, SUCH AS INTERROGATORY 2 THEORIES, OR FROM DEPOSITIONS OF LOWER-LEVEL EMPLOYEES WITH 3 MORE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AT ISSUE. 4 CERTAINLY, THE FACT THAT YOU'RE AN APEX WITNESS DOES NOT 5 PROHIBIT CATEGORICALLY YOUR DEPOSITION, BUT IT IS SOMETHING 6 THAT THE COURT NEEDS TO CONSIDER. AFTER REVIEWING HIS 7 DECLARATION AND THE OTHER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, AS I SAID, I 8 9 DID -- OR I DO FIND THAT HE IS AN APEX WITNESS, AND I ALSO FIND THAT MITCHELL HAS NOT SATISFIED THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO DEPOSE 10 HIM. MITCHELL INDICATED THAT THEY WANTED TO DEPOSE HIM ON HIS 11 KNOWLEDGE OF MITCHELL'S OWN PRODUCTS IN EARLY 2000, WHEN HE 12 WORKED FOR THEM, AND ABOUT A PATENT THAT WAS CITED AS RELEVANT 13 14 ART IN THE APPLICATION FOR A PATENT AT ISSUE IN THIS LITIGATION. 15 INITIALLY, I FIND THAT THEY HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED ANY UNIQUE 16 INFORMATION THAT HE HAS WITH REGARD TO MITCHELL'S OWN PRODUCTS. 17 COMMON SENSE INDICATES THAT THERE ARE LIKELY NUMEROUS MITCHELL 18 19 EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE THE SAME OR BETTER INFORMATION REGARDING MITCHELL'S OWN PRODUCTS. IN ADDITION, MITCHELL HAS NOT 20 21 IDENTIFIED ANY FACTS, E-MAILS, DOCUMENTS, TESTIMONY, OR ANYTHING ELSE INDICATING THAT MR. AQUILA HAS UNIQUE 22 INFORMATION. I HAVE REVIEWED HIS DECLARATION, AND I THINK IT 23 SUPPORTS THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS ON THIS FACT. AND MITCHELL 24

HAS NOT PROVIDED ANY CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE.

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ON THE PRIOR ART ISSUE, HE IS ONE OF NINE INVENTORS. AND THE OTHER INVENTORS, PRESUMABLY WHO DO NOT WORK FOR AN ENTITY RELATED TO AUDATEX, HAVE NOT BEEN DEPOSED. IN ADDITION, AUDATEX ASSERTS THAT THE PRIOR ART PATENT IS ASSIGNED TO MITCHELL, AND SOME OF THE INVENTORS ARE MITCHELL EMPLOYEES. AS A RESULT, I FIND THAT MITCHELL HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT HE HAS ANY UNIQUE NONCUMULATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AT ISSUE, AND I FIND THEY HAVEN'T SATISFIED THE FIRST ELEMENT. I ALSO FIND THAT THEY HAVEN'T SATISFIED THE SECOND ELEMENT. BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T ESTABLISHED THAT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO GET THIS, ESPECIALLY FROM THEIR OWN EMPLOYEES. MITCHELL ARGUES THAT THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEPOSE ANYONE WITH KNOWLEDGE; THEY DON'T HAVE TO DEPOSE THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE. AND CERTAINLY THAT IS TRUE. HOWEVER, IN THIS CASE, HE'S AN APEX WITNESS, AND THEY HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THE NEED FOR HIS TESTIMONY. IN FACT, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THE REASON THEY WANT TO DEPOSE THIS INDIVIDUAL, AS OPPOSED TO ALL OF THE OTHERS WITH SIMILAR KNOWLEDGE, IS THE FACT THAT HE LEFT MITCHELL AND WENT TO WORK FOR SOLERA, WHICH IS RELATED TO AUDATEX. THEREFORE, THAT MOTION IS DENIED. THE NEXT MOTION IS AUDATEX'S MOTION TO COMPEL DAMAGE DISCOVERY. AND I'M GRANTING THAT. I'VE GRANTED IT BEFORE. GRANTED IT THE FIRST TIME. I GRANTED IT ON RECONSIDERATION. AND I'M NOW GRANTING IT ON ANOTHER MOTION. ALL OF THE SAME ARGUMENTS ARE BEING MADE BY MITCHELL. I'M ACTUALLY NOT GOING

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TO GO BACK THROUGH ALL OF THOSE ARGUMENTS, AND I REFERENCE MY PRIOR ORDER ON THIS CASE AND MY ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION. INITIAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS FROM AUDATEX SOUGHT INFORMATION FROM THE 2000 -- FROM 2006 TO THE PRESENT. AUDATEX OPPOSED ON --MITCHELL OPPOSED ON THE BASIS THAT AUDATEX WAS NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH DAMAGES UNDER 35, U.S.C., SECTION 154(D) AND SO REFUSED TO ANSWER. I OVERRULED THAT, REQUIRED THEM TO ANSWER. THEY THEN APPARENTLY IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE REQUEST WAS 2006 TO THE PRESENT, AND THEY PROVIDED ONLY DOCUMENTS FROM MARCH OF 2011. I FIND THERE IS NO BASIS FOR WHAT THEY'RE DOING. AS I INDICATED, THERE CLEARLY STATED IN MY ORIGINAL ORDER, THE COURT IS NOT ASKING -- IS NOT BEING ASKED TO DECIDE WHETHER AUDATEX IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 154(D). I MAKE NO RULING, WHATSOEVER, ON THAT ISSUE. HOWEVER, DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 26 IS VERY BROAD. AND AUDATEX IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES RELATING TO CLAIMS THAT THEY'RE MAKING. THEY'RE MAKING THIS CLAIM, THEY'RE ENTITLED TO THESE DAMAGES. SO ONCE AGAIN, THIS MOTION TO COMPEL IS GRANTED. I INITIALLY REQUIRED THIS TO BE PRODUCED MANY MONTHS AGO. I, THEREFORE, AM ORDERING MITCHELL TO PRODUCE THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS AND PROVIDE A SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE BY MONDAY, FEBRUARY 2ND. MR. WHITE: CAN I --23 THE COURT: SURE.

MR. WHITE: SO THE ISSUE OF 154 WAS NOT SQUARELY

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BEFORE -- BEFORE, IN FACT, THEY AMENDED DURING INTERROGATORY
RESPONSE AFTER THE ORIGINAL MOTION TO GRANT, THE MOTION TO
COMPEL WAS GRANTED. THAT WAS A SUPPLEMENTAL. THEY DIDN'T
RAISE 154, A SPECIFIC BASIS, PRE-ISSUANCE DAMAGES, AND THEY
DIDN'T PROVIDE ANY BASIS UNTIL AFTER THAT. SO I JUST WANT --
WE WILL ABIDE BY YOUR ORDER. WE DON'T WANT YOU TO THINK WE
WERE WILLFULLY IGNORING YOUR ORDER. THIS WHOLE ISSUE OF
PRE-ISSUANCE DAMAGES WAS NOT TEE'D UP UNTIL AFTER THE FIRST
MOTION TO COMPEL WAS GRANTED.
         THE COURT: WELL, MY FIRST ISSUE, THEIR REQUEST WAS
ANNUAL STATEMENTS FROM 2006 TO THE PRESENT. AND I GRANTED IT.
         MR. WHITE: I UNDERSTAND.
         THE COURT: AND YOU ONLY PROVIDED IT -- YOU
RECONSIDERED ON -- YOU ONLY PROVIDED IT ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS. I
HAD TO FILE ANOTHER MOTION SAYING MORE PRODUCTS. I DIDN'T
REALIZE AT THE TIME THAT YOU HADN'T PROVIDED THE FULL TIME
PERIOD, SO NOW WE'RE ON OUR THIRD MOTION. I'M GRANTING IT.
PROVIDE THAT INFORMATION BY MONDAY.
    ALL RIGHT. THE NEXT ONE IS AUDATEX'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL
OF DR. SULLIVAN AS AN EXPERT. AND MITCHELL WAS OPPOSED TO THIS
BECAUSE THEY CONTACTED WITH DR. SULLIVAN AND HIS COMPANY,
INTENSITY CORP. AND THEY'RE CONCERNED -- THEY BELIEVE THEY
PROVIDED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO HIM THAT MAKES HIM UNABLE
THEN TO -- CREATES A CONFLICT THAT SHOULD PREVENT HIM FROM
SERVING AS AN EXPERT FOR AUDATEX. I HAVE REVIEWED THE
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DECLARATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY BOTH DR. SULLIVAN AND
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    THE RAVI NEMANI -- AM I SAYING THAT RIGHT? IS HE YOUR WITNESS?
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              MR. WHITE: IT IS A SHE.
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              THE COURT: I'M SORRY, THAT'S HOW BAD IT IS. OKAY.
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    RAVI NEMANI.
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              MR. WHITE: THAT IS CLOSE ENOUGH.
              THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. SO I REVIEWED
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    BOTH OF THOSE DECLARATIONS. AND OBVIOUSLY THERE IS A
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    PROTECTIVE ORDER IN PLACE HERE THAT GOVERNS THE PRODUCTION OF
    INFORMATION TO EXPERTS. FOR EXPERT DISOUALIFICATION, THE
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    PARTIES GENERALLY FOLLOW -- OR SORRY, THE COURT GENERALLY
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    FOLLOWS A TWO PART -- OR APPLIES A TWO-PART TEST. FIRST, COULD
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    THE PARTY CLAIMING A CONFLICT REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT IT HAD A
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    CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXPERT; AND TWO, DID THAT
    PARTY DISCLOSE ANY CONFIDENTIAL OR PRIVILEGED INFORMATION TO
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    THE EXPERT? THAT STANDARD HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN A NUMBER OF
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    CASES, INCLUDING ALIEN TECHNOLOGY CORP VS. INTERMEC, INC., A
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    2007 WESTLAW 4261972 AT 1, OUT OF -- AND ALSO A 2012 CASE OUT
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    OF SAN DIEGO, PELLERIN VS. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, 2012,
    WESTLAW 112539, AT 2.
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         IN REACHING THIS DECISION, SOME COURTS HAVE DISTINGUISHED,
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    QUOTE, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT RELATES TO PURELY
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    TECHNICAL OR BUSINESS INFORMATION THAT IS DISCOVERABLE IN
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    LITIGATION, AND INFORMATION THAT RELATES TO CONFIDENTIAL
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    COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING LEGAL STRATEGIES AND OTHER
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LITIGATION-RELATED ISSUES THAT IS PRIVILEGED AND NOT OTHERWISE
SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY, CLOSED QUOTES. THAT IS SAUL VS. SPRINT
NEXTEL CORP, 2013 WESTLAW 501783, AT PAGE 7, THAT IS FROM
KANSAS.
    AND THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA HAS REACHED A
SIMILAR DECISION IN RE JDS UNIPHASE CORP SECURITIES LITIGATION.
    COURTS ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER IN EVALUATING THIS TWO-PART
TEST POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF THE PARTY TO
RETAIN AN EXPERT OF ITS OWN CHOOSING, THE PREJUDICE THE
RETAINING PARTY MIGHT EXPERIENCE IF NOT ALLOWED TO CHOOSE ITS
OWN EXPERT AND MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS. THE PARTY SEEKING DISQUALIFICATION BEARS THE BURDEN
OF SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY AND ITS
NONWAIVER.
     IN THIS CASE, INITIALLY, I THINK IT'S SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR
WHETHER MITCHELL ACTUALLY HAD THE REQUISITE CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH DR. SULLIVAN. AS THE DECLARATIONS FROM BOTH
INDIVIDUALS INDICATE, MITCHELL AND DR. SULLIVAN DID EXECUTE A
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT, NDA, WHICH WAS BACKDATED TO APPLY TO
THE SECOND MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO ENTITIES OR INDIVIDUALS.
BUT THE NDA DEFINES THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT AS, QUOTE,
DISCUSSIONS AND INFORMATION RELATED, BUT NOT LIMITED TO A
POTENTIAL BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP REGARDING DATA ASSETS. THIS
LANGUAGE DOES NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISH THAT REQUISITE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION OF -- OR EXCUSE ME, CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT
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THE BIGGER ISSUE TO ME IS THE SECOND ELEMENT, AND THAT IS, I FIND THAT MITCHELL HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS A DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL OR PRIVILEGED INFORMATION THAT AFFECTS DR. SULLIVAN'S WORK WITH AUDATEX IN THIS CASE. WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION THAT IT DISCLOSED, MITCHELL CLAIMED THAT MS. RAVI NEMANI'S DECLARATION, THAT IT SHARED, QUOTE, SPECIFIC DETAILS ABOUT MITCHELL'S POTENTIAL NEW DATA PRODUCTS, CLOSED QUOTES, AND DISCUSSED HOW INTENSITY COULD SUPPORT THE, QUOTE, DEVELOPMENT AND RELEASE OF THESE NEW PRODUCTS, CLOSED OUOTE. MITCHELL DOES NOT EXPLAIN HOW THIS INFORMATION, THE NEW DATA PRODUCTS, RELATE IN ANY WAY TO THE LEGAL STRATEGIES OR LITIGATION-RELATED ISSUES IN GENERAL OR SPECIFICALLY IN THIS CASE. I FIND THAT DR. SULLIVAN'S INTERACTIONS WITH MITCHELL WERE VERY, VERY -- AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME INFORMATION THAT MITCHELL PROVIDED TO HIM, BUT BECAUSE IT IS RELATING TO THESE NEW DATA PRODUCTS AND HOW THEY COULD RELEASE NEW PRODUCTS, TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY DID PROVIDE ANY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, I DON'T SEE HOW THAT AFFECTS IN ANY WAY HIS WORK WITH AUDATEX ON THESE PRODUCTS AND PATENTS THAT HAD BEEN IN PLACE FOR A WHILE. I FIND THAT THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THOSE TWO, AND THAT MITCHELL DIDN'T PROVIDE THAT INFORMATION OR MAKE THAT -- ESTABLISH THAT FACT. IN ADDITION, AUDATEX DID PROVIDE EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT IT WOULD BE PREJUDICED BY HIS DISQUALIFICATION BECAUSE IT HAS

ALREADY PAID HIM A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF MONEY FOR THE WORK 1 THAT HE HAS DONE AND IS DOING. 2 ALSO, MITCHELL DOES NOT ADDRESS WHY THE PROVISIONS OF THE 3 PROTECTIVE ORDER ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THEM IN THIS 4 SITUATION. GIVEN ALL OF THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, I FIND THAT 5 DR. SULLIVAN DID NOT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH MITCHELL THAT 6 PREVENTS HIM FROM SERVING AS AN EXPERT FOR AUDATEX IN THIS 7 LITIGATION. I, THEREFORE, GRANT AUDATEX'S MOTION TO APPROVE 8 9 HIM AND DENY MITCHELL'S ARGUMENTS THAT HE SHOULD BE DISOUALIFIED FROM THIS LITIGATION. 10 MR. WHITE: CAN I ASK ONE QUESTION, YOUR HONOR? 11 THE COURT: SURE. 12 MR. WHITE: THERE WAS A SEPARATE INDEPENDENT GROUNDS 13 14 FOR OUR MOTION, I GUESS -- OR THEIR MOTION, AND EXPLAIN THE --SO THERE ARE TWO WAYS THAT WE THINK --15 THE COURT: YEAH. I WENT THROUGH AND I LOOKED AT THE 16 PROTECTIVE ORDER. I DON'T THINK THAT THE PROTECTIVE ORDER, IT 17 DOES DISQUALIFY HIM. I LOOKED AT PARAGRAPH 11 AND PARAGRAPH 4 18 19 THAT ADDRESSES THE DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT EXPERT AND THE EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL -- THE DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT 20 21 EXPERT AND THE EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. AND I 22 FIND THAT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THAT THE PROTECTIVE ORDER DOES NOT PREVENT HIM FROM SERVING AS AN EXPERT IN THIS 23 24 CASE.

MR. WHITE: OKAY.

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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. OKAY, THEN, AUDATEX FILED A NEW MOTION JANUARY 19TH, TO COMPEL A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL DISCOVERIES, DEPOSITIONS. THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT A NUMBER OF DEPOSITIONS -- I DIDN'T WRITE DOWN THE NUMBER. MY RECOLLECTION IS IT WAS ABOUT EIGHT OR TEN -- ARE GOING TO GO FORWARD ON SPECIFIC DATES. THEY'RE LISTED ON -- BOTH PARTIES LIST THEM IN THEIR PAPERS. AND I AM NOW REQUIRING, ORDERING, THE DEPOSITIONS TO GO FORWARD ON THE DATES THAT ARE SET FORTH IN AUDATEX'S MOTION AND MITCHELL'S OPPOSITION. THEY'RE THE SAME DATES. THE ONE DEPOSITION THAT DID NOT HAVE A DATE WAS STEVE MORTON. AND THAT WAS ACTUALLY JUST MENTIONED IN MITCHELL'S DOCUMENT. DO YOU GUYS HAVE A DATE FOR THAT? MR. WHITE: WE DON'T HAVE A SPECIFIC DATE YET. HE WAS -- HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY AUDATEX. WE HAVE REACHED OUT TO HIM TO FIND A DATE, AND WE'RE HOPING TO SECURE A DATE IN FEBRUARY FOR HIM. AND WE'LL WORK WITH AUDATEX ON SCHEDULING THAT. THE COURT: WHAT HAVE YOU HEARD FROM HIM? IT IS YOUR SUBPOENA? MR. MCPHIE: WE FINALLY DID SUBPOENA HIM. WE UNDERSTOOD INITIALLY THAT COUNSEL FOR MITCHELL IS ACCEPTING SERVICE, AND WE LATER HEARD THAT THEY DID NOT. SO IT SOUNDS LIKE HE NEEDS TO BE TRACKED DOWN. HE WAS ACTUALLY SERVED WITH A SUBPOENA. HE INFORMED US THAT HE COULDN'T GO FORWARD ON THAT DATE.

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THE COURT: WHAT DATE DID YOU SET IT FOR?
1
             MR. MCPHIE: IT WAS THE 28TH, YESTERDAY. BUT IT
2
    SOUNDS LIKE MAYBE NOW THERE HAS BEEN SOME COMMUNICATION.
3
             MR. WHITE: HE DID CONTACT US. HE IS A FORMER
4
    EMPLOYEE OF OURS. HE CONTACTED US, AND WE'RE TRYING TO FIND A
5
    DATE TO WORK WITH HIM, AND AUDATEX WILL TRY TO FIND A DATE FOR
6
    THIS ISSUE.
7
              THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU WANT ME TO LEAVE THAT OPEN?
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9
    I DO NOT WANT ANOTHER MOTION FILED ON THIS. ARE YOU GOING TO
    BE ABLE TO WORK OUT A DATE?
10
             MR. WHITE: I THINK SO.
11
              THE COURT: IF NOT, I'LL ARBITRARILY SET ONE AS I SIT
12
    HERE RIGHT NOW.
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14
             MR. WHITE: I THINK WE'LL BE ABLE TO WORK ON THAT AND
    AGREE ON A LOT OF THINGS.
15
             THE COURT: YOU DID AGREE ON ALL THE OTHER DEPOSITION
16
    DATES. ARE YOU GOING TO BE ABLE TO AGREE ON THIS ONE?
17
             MR. WHITE: I ACCEPT COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION THAT
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19
    WE'LL GET A DATE (INAUDIBLE).
              THE COURT: OKAY. THE LAST DEPOSITION IS
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21
    FEBRUARY 11TH; IS THAT RIGHT?
22
             MR. MCPHIE: I BELIEVE THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.
    YES.
23
             THE COURT: IS THAT RIGHT? SO FEBRUARY 11TH IS A
24
    WEDNESDAY. I'M GOING TO REQUIRE MR. MORTON'S DEPOSITION TO
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OCCUR BY THE 16TH. CAN YOU GET HIM IN IN THIS TIME? YOU HAVE
1
    TWO PLUS WEEKS FROM NOW.
2
              MR. WHITE: WE'LL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN. UNLESS HE IS
3
    OUT OF THE COUNTRY OR SOMETHING, WE'LL FIND OUT.
4
              THE COURT: YOU DON'T KNOW YET?
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              MR. WHITE: I DON'T.
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              MR. MCPHIE: AND OUR PRIMARY CONCERN, THAT I'M
7
    GUESSING WE'RE GETTING THERE, IS HOW THIS THING -- (INAUDIBLE).
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9
              THE COURT: YEAH. SO I'M GOING TO REQUIRE THAT
    DEPOSITION TO OCCUR BY FEBRUARY 16TH, UNLESS THE TWO OF YOU
10
    AGREE TO A DATE AFTERWARDS, THE TWO SIDES. AND THEN IT HAS TO
11
    BE QUICKLY. BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHO HE IS IN RELATION TO THE
12
    NEEDS OF THE -- YOU KNOW, FOR THE EXPERTS. BUT WE'RE MOVING
13
14
    INTO EXPERT DISCOVERY.
         OKAY. THE NEXT ISSUE IS THE DEPOSITION OF PAUL
15
    ROSENSTEIN. THAT TRANSCRIPT IS SEALED. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT
16
    THERE IS ANY REASON TO GO INTO ANY OF HIS SPECIFIC TESTIMONY IN
17
    ORDER TO RULE ON THIS MOTION. AS BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGE,
18
19
    CLEARLY A 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION IS SEPARATE FROM A DEPOSITION OF
    AN INDIVIDUAL, AND PARTIES ARE ABLE TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION OF
20
    AN INDIVIDUAL, EVEN IF HE OR SHE ALSO SERVED AS A 30(B)(6)
21
22
    WITNESS.
         THAT BEING SAID, IN THIS CASE, I DID REVIEW THE WHOLE DEPO
23
    TRANSCRIPT. IT CLEARLY WAS NOTICED AS A 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION.
24
25
    THE SCOPE OF THE 30(B)(6) CATEGORIES THAT HE WAS TESTIFYING ON
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WERE VERY NARROW. MITCHELL AND AUDATEX'S COUNSEL REPEATEDLY ASKED QUESTIONS THAT, IN MY OPINION, ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THAT 30(B)(6) NOTICE. MITCHELL REPEATEDLY OBJECTED TO THE QUESTIONS AS BEING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE 30(B)(6), BUT ALLOWED THE WITNESS TO THEN ANSWER THE OUESTIONS. ONE OF THE EARLY EXCHANGES ON THIS DISPUTE WAS -- I THINK WAS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT. AND MITCHELL'S COUNSEL, WHO WAS PRESENT, SPECIFICALLY STATED, JUST SO WE'RE CLEAR -- THIS IS A QUOTE, JUST SO WE'RE CLEAR, OUR POSITION IS, YOU GET HIS PERSONAL DEPOSITION ONE TIME. IF YOU'RE GOING TO DO IT NOW, WE'RE GOING TO OBJECT TO ANY FURTHER DEPOSITION OF HIM. I WANT TO BE CLEAR ON THE RECORD, IF YOU'RE GOING TO PROCEED IN ASKING HIM QUESTIONS WE THINK ARE PERSONAL DEPOSITION QUESTIONS, THAT IS GOING TO BE OUR POSITION GOING FORWARD. AUDATEX'S COUNSEL RESPONDED TO THAT BY STATING, YOU CAN ANSWER THE QUESTION. THERE WERE NUMEROUS OTHER INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO LAWYERS OVER THIS ISSUE. THERE WERE SEVERAL TIMES WHERE COUNSEL FOR AUDATEX CLARIFIED THE -- QUOTE, CLARIFIED THAT HE DID NOT, QUOTE, BELIEVE THAT THE PRIOR LINE OF QUESTIONING -- DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRIOR LINE OF QUESTIONING IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE 30(B)(6) NOTICE. AND AS I'VE INDICATED OR STATED, BOTH LAWYERS SET FORTH THIS POSITION, NUMEROUS POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE DEPOSITIONS. WHAT THIS SHOWS ME IS THIS DISPUTE WAS VERY CLEAR ON THIS DATE IN AUGUST, AUGUST 27TH, OF 2014. I BELIEVE, AS I SAID,

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THAT THERE WERE QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE NOTICED 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION. MITCHELL OBJECTED, LET THE WITNESS ANSWER. AND THE WITNESS THEN DID ANSWER ON HIS OWN INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. AND MITCHELL STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT THIS WAS HIS DEPOSITION, HIS INDIVIDUAL DEPOSITION. AUDATEX CLEARLY STATED THAT THEY DISAGREED WITH THAT POSITION. DESPITE THAT FACT -- AND THAT IS AUGUST, AUDATEX DID NOT TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION UNTIL FILING THIS MOTION IN JANUARY -- ON JANUARY 19TH, OF THIS YEAR. THIS COURT'S CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER REQUIRES ANY DISCOVERY DISPUTES TO BE BROUGHT TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION WITHIN 30 DAYS OF IMPASSE, BUT NO LATER THAN 60 DAYS AFTER GIVING -- AFTER THE DATE THAT GIVES RISE TO THE DISPUTE. THIS DISPUTE CLEARLY AROSE ON AUGUST 27TH. THE WHOLE REASON I HAVE THAT REQUIREMENT IN THE -- IN THE CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER IS TO PREVENT ISSUES LIKE THIS. WHEN THERE IS CLEARLY A DISPUTE BETWEEN PARTIES, IT NEEDS TO GET RESOLVED. AUDATEX CHOSE, FOR WHATEVER REASON, NOT TO DO ANYTHING WITH THIS UNTIL ALMOST FIVE MONTHS LATER. I FIND, THEREFORE, THAT THEIR MOTION IS UNTIMELY, AND I DENY IT ON THAT BASIS. IN ADDITION, AS I STATED, I DO BELIEVE THAT AUDATEX ASKED QUESTIONS THAT WERE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION, AND THAT MITCHELL ALLOWED THE DEPONENT TO ANSWER THEM IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY. THAT WOULD BE AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS TO DENY THE MOTION. I RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS LIKELY THAT

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HAD AUDATEX HAD ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS, THEY WOULD HAVE ASKED HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL. SO I THINK THERE COULD BE MORE ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS OF IT, BUT TO ME, THIS WAS A DISPUTE THAT WAS CLEAR IN AUGUST. AND IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED WITH THE COURT INITIALLY, OR IMMEDIATELY, IF AUDATEX BELIEVED THAT MR. ROSENSTEIN'S INFORMATION WAS IMPORTANT OR RELEVANT. SO I AM DENYING AUDATEX'S MOTION TO DEPOSE -- NO -- YES, I'M DENYING THE MOTION TO DEPOSE MR. ROSENSTEIN AS AN INDIVIDUAL. THE NEXT ISSUE WAS INTERROGATORIES 5 THROUGH 7. RULE 26(E)(1) REOUIRES LITIGANTS TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR DISCLOSURES AND INTERROGATORY RESPONSES, QUOTE, A, IN A TIMELY MANNER, IF THE PARTY LEARNS THAT IN SOME MATERIAL RESPECT THE DISCLOSURE OR RESPONSE IS INCOMPLETE OR INCORRECT. AND IF THE ADDITIONAL 13 CORRECTIVE INFORMATION HAS NOT OTHERWISE BEEN MADE TO THE OTHER PARTIES DURING THE DISCOVERY PROCESS OR IN WRITING, OR B, AS ORDERED BY THE COURT. 16 IN THIS CASE, BOTH PARTIES INDICATE THAT THE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED DURING A DEPOSITION. AS SUCH, IT HAS OTHERWISE BEEN MADE TO THE -- HAS OTHERWISE BEEN MADE KNOWN TO THE OTHER PARTIES DURING THE DISCOVERY PROCESS, AND I, THEREFORE, AM NOT GOING TO ORDER MITCHELL TO SUPPLEMENT THE INTERROGATORIES THAT WERE IDENTIFIED. I DO BELIEVE THAT INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN TO 23 AUDATEX FROM THE DEPOSITION. HOWEVER, I DO WANT TO REMIND BOTH

PARTIES THAT THEY DO HAVE A CONTINUING OBLIGATION UNDER RULE 26

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TO SUPPLEMENT ANY RESPONSES IF NECESSARY. YOU'RE ALL GOOD
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    LAWYERS. YOU KNOW WHAT THAT MEANS.
2
         SO I AM DENYING AUDATEX'S MOTION ON THAT RESPECT.
3
         ACCESS TO EXECUTABLE AND SOURCE CODE OF THE ACCUSED
4
    PRODUCTS DURING DEPOSITION. IS THAT NOW MOOT, OR IS IT STILL
5
    RELEVANT TO THE REMAINING DEPOSITIONS?
6
             MR. MCPHIE: IT IS RELEVANT, YOUR HONOR. THERE HAS
7
    BEEN A DEVELOPMENT THERE. WE TRIED TO PROPOSE MAYBE A
8
9
    COMPROMISE, AND WE'RE NOT QUITE THERE YET. ONE OF THE ISSUES
    THAT WAS RAISED IN MITCHELL'S OPPOSITION WAS THAT THE SOURCE
10
    CODE WAS TO BE PRODUCED AT COUNSEL'S OFFICE, IN THIS CASE, IN
11
    IRVINE, CALIFORNIA. AND THERE IS SOME RELUCTANCE TO HAVE THAT
12
    SOURCE CODE MOVED TO ANOTHER LOCATION. UNDER THE -- WHAT WE
13
14
    HAD PROPOSED WAS THAT TO SATISFY OUR CONCERNS ABOUT HAVING THAT
    VARIABLE AS NEEDED DURING THE DEPOSITION, THAT THE DEPOSITION
15
    TAKE PLACE AT THAT OFFICE IN IRVINE. AND SEEING THAT WAS MAYBE
16
    A WAY OF ADDRESSING THE PROTECTIVE ORDER ISSUES, BUT ALSO
17
    ALLOWING FOR US TO HAVE ACCESS TO THAT DURING THE DEPOSITIONS.
18
19
              THE COURT: WHAT IS MITCHELL'S POSITION? ARE YOU
    WILLING TO AGREE TO THAT?
20
21
             MR. WHITE: WE'RE NOT, YOUR HONOR. AND TWO REASONS,
    FIRST, IS THAT IT'S NOT CONVENIENT FOR OUR WITNESSES. IT IS
22
    ADDITIONAL TRAVEL. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE WAS NEVER ANY
23
    CONTEMPLATION OF PRODUCING THIS SOURCE CODE IN THIS MANNER.
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WAS A HEAVILY NEGOTIATED SOURCE CODE PROTECTIVE ORDER.

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AGREED HOW THAT WOULD BE HANDLED. IT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES HOW THE SOURCE CODE IS TO BE USED DURING DEPOSITIONS. IT SAYS IN A PRINTED FORMAT. SO THIS IDEA THAT WE NEED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH A COMPUTER, I'M NOT EVEN SURE WHAT ALL HAS TO BE ON IT FOR THEIR USE. I GUESS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE DEPOSITION OF OUR FOLKS -- I MEAN, IT IS JUST A LOT OF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS BURDENED ON US THAT WAS NEVER CONTEMPLATED OR DISCUSSED WITH THE PARTIES BEFORE THIS OR ADDRESSED IN THE SOURCE CODE PROTECTIVE ORDER. FOR THAT REASON --THE COURT: OKAY, THAT IS WHAT I WANTED TO SEE, IF YOU REACHED AN AGREEMENT. MR. MCPHIE: AND AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, AND THIS IS FROM EXPERIENCE, IN SOME OF THESE CASES ALL SOFTWARE, HERE IS WHAT HAPPENS IN THE DEPOSITION, THE PRINTED SOURCE, THEY START TO LOOK AT IT. THESE ARE ENGINEERS WHO ARE NOT USED TO LOOKING AT PRINTED SOURCE CODE. THEY WANT TO BE ABLE TO LOOK AT IT AND SEE HOW IT FUNCTIONS NEXT TO THE OTHER FUNCTION. AND VERY OFTEN, IN PAST CASES, YOU GET THE RESPONSE, WELL, IF I COULD LOOK AT THE ELECTRONIC VERSION, I COULD ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, BUT IN THIS FORMAT, IT IS TOO DIFFICULT. SO IT'S A PRACTICAL CONCERN, AND WE DON'T THINK THAT DRIVING AN HOUR UP THE 5 TO GET TO IRVINE IS OF ANY SIGNIFICANT BURDEN ON MITCHELL. THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I UNDERSTAND THAT. HOWEVER, I DO BELIEVE THAT THE PROTECTIVE ORDER CLEARLY GOVERNS THIS. THESE TWO PARTIES IN THIS LITIGATION HAVE HAD NUMEROUS

DISPUTES, AND EVERY ISSUE HAS REALLY BEEN HOTLY CONTESTED. 1 PARTIES SPENT A LOT OF TIME COMING UP WITH A PROTECTIVE ORDER, 2 AND THIS COURT IS GOING TO ENFORCE THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. 3 PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER GOVERNS THE PRODUCTION AND 4 USE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE CODE. PARAGRAPH A SPECIFICALLY 5 STATES THAT THE SOURCE CODE WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AT COUNSEL'S 6 OFFICE, UNDER SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS. AND THEN PARAGRAPH B SAYS 7 THAT EACH PARTY MAY REQUEST PAPER COPIES OF SOURCE CODE 8 9 NECESSARY FOR COURT FILINGS, DEPOSITIONS, AND TRIAL. TO ME, THIS PARAGRAPH, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO 10 PARTIES SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATED THE ISSUE THAT HAS NOW 11 ARISEN, AND IT RESOLVED IT. AND THAT IS THAT YOU'RE GOING TO 12 USE PAPER COPIES. I UNDERSTAND THAT AUDATEX DOESN'T BELIEVE 13 14 THAT THAT IS -- THAT IS AS EFFICIENT AND BENEFICIAL AS THEY WOULD LIKE. HOWEVER, YOU ALSO KNEW THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF 15 THE CASE, AS YOU JUST INDICATED IN YOUR ARGUMENT, THIS IS 16 SOMETHING YOU'VE SEEN IN PAST CASES, AS WELL AS IN THIS CASE, 17 THAT ENGINEERS LIKE TO SEE THE ACTUAL SOURCE CODE. FOR 18 19 WHATEVER REASONS, THE PARTIES REACHED THIS AGREEMENT AND I'M GOING TO ENFORCE THAT. I, THEREFORE, DENY AUDATEX'S MOTION ON 20 21 THAT ISSUE. 22 ALL RIGHT, THE FINAL THING IS THE MODIFICATION OF THE CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER. I AM NOT GOING TO SET DIFFERENT DATES FOR 23 THE EXPERT REPORTS; HOWEVER, I AM INCLINED TO MOVE THEM BACK 24 25 SLIGHTLY. I WANT TO BE CLEAR, FACT DISCOVERY CLOSES TOMORROW.

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YOU CANNOT DO ANY FACT DISCOVERY AFTER TOMORROW EXCEPT FOR THE DEPOSITIONS THAT WE'VE ALREADY DISCUSSED OR SOMETHING THAT THE TWO SIDES AGREE ON. AND THEN THAT IS OUT OF MY CONTROL. THAT IS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT; OTHERWISE, FACT DISCOVERY CLOSES TOMORROW. BECAUSE THE DEPOSITIONS ARE NOT GOING TO FINISH UNTIL MID FEBRUARY, WHAT I AM INCLINED TO DO IS TO MAKE THE OPENING EXPERT REPORT DEADLINE FEBRUARY 18TH. FOR BOTH PARTIES, REBUTTAL EXPERTS FOR BOTH PARTIES, MARCH 2ND, AND THEN CLOSE OF EXPERT DISCOVERY, MARCH 26TH. THOSE WERE THE DATES PROPOSED BY AUDATEX, FOR AUDATEX. AND I WOULD BE IMPOSING THEM FOR BOTH. IF YOU WANT TO BE HEARD ON THAT ONE, THAT IS ONE I'M GOING TO LET BOTH SIDES BE HEARD ON. MR. MCPHIE: THAT'S ACCEPTABLE, YOUR HONOR, TO AUDATEX. MR. WHITE: THE ONLY SUGGESTION THAT WE WOULD HAVE, YOUR HONOR, IS TO PUSH BACK THE MARCH 2ND DATE A WEEK. REASON FOR THAT IS FEBRUARY 18TH IS WHEN WE'RE GOING TO GET TWO REPORTS FROM THE PLAINTIFF, THEIR INFRINGEMENT REPORT AND ALSO THEIR DAMAGES REPORT. AND SO THE BULK OF THE WORK ON THE MARCH 2ND DATE FALLS TO US. AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN ADDITIONAL WEEK ON THAT. WE THINK WE CAN GET THE REPORT, THE DEPOSITIONS DONE IN THE WEEKS THAT FOLLOW. WE DON'T THINK WE NEED 24 DAYS FOR THE DEPOSITIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE SOME

ADDITIONAL TIME TO RESPOND TO THOSE TWO INITIAL REPORTS THAT

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WE'RE GOING TO BE RESPONDING TO ON THE 2ND AND HAVE ADDITIONAL
1
    TIME.
2
              THE COURT: HOW MANY EXPERTS ARE THERE?
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              MR. WHITE: SO THERE WILL LIKELY BE -- THERE SHOULD
4
    BE THREE REPORTS, FEBRUARY 18TH. THERE SHOULD BE AN INITIAL
5
    REPORT FROM AUDATEX ON INFRINGEMENT, AN INITIAL REPORT FROM
6
    THEM ON DAMAGES, AND A REPORT FROM US ON VALIDITY.
7
              THE COURT: OKAY.
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              MR. WHITE: SO IN ACTUALITY, THEY HAVE ONE RESPONSE,
9
    AND WE HAVE TWO AT THAT STAGE.
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              THE COURT: YES, SIR.
11
              MR. MCPHIE: OUR CONCERN HAS JUST BEEN THE HISTORY IN
12
    THIS CASE HAS NOT SUGGESTED THAT SCHEDULING DEPOSITIONS IS
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14
    EASY.
              THE COURT: YEAH.
15
              MR. MCPHIE: AND SO PROVIDING FOR A SHORTER TIME
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    PERIOD FOR US TO DO THAT I THINK IS DANGEROUS. AND THE ONLY
17
    THING I WOULD SAY IS THERE IS GOING TO BE MAYBE FOUR
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19
    DEPOSITIONS. I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY EXPERTS THEY HAVE. IT
    COULD BE --
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21
              THE COURT: SIX, WOULDN'T IT?
22
              MR. MCPHIE: IT WOULD BE SIX AT THE MOST. IT COULD
    BE THE SAME EXPERT FOR INFRINGEMENT AND VALIDITY, SO AT MOST
23
    SIX. AND WE THINK WE HAVE RIGHT NOW THREE WEEKS TO DO THAT.
24
              THE COURT: HOW MANY HAVE YOU DESIGNATED?
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MR. MCPHIE: I BELIEVE WE'VE DESIGNATED THREE. 1 THE COURT: SO YOU ANTICIPATE THREE EXPERTS, AND THEY 2 NEED TO DEPOSE THOSE THREE, ASSUMING THEY DO. 3 MR. MCPHIE: YEAH, TWO OR THREE. 4 THE COURT: TWO OR THREE. 5 MR. WHITE: SAME FOR US, TWO OR THREE. 6 THE COURT: SO IT COULD BE SIX. I'LL GIVE YOU A 7 COUPLE OF EXTRA DAYS. THE REPORTS ARE FEBRUARY 18, SO TWO 8 WEEKS WOULD BE MARCH 4TH. THAT WILL GIVE YOU A LITTLE 9 ADDITIONAL TIME TO DO THAT. BUT I DO THINK WE NEED TO GET THIS 10 DISCOVERY COMPLETED AND GET THIS CASE MOVING. 11 ALL RIGHT. SO IT WILL BE, FACT DISCOVERY CLOSES TOMORROW; 12 OPENING REPORTS, FEBRUARY 18TH; REBUTTAL REPORTS, MARCH 4TH; 13 14 CLOSE OF EXPERT DISCOVERY, MARCH 26TH. ALL OTHER DATES REMAIN AS SET. 15 I HATE TO EVEN ASK THIS, BUT ANY OTHER ISSUES THAT I HAVE 16 TO ADDRESS TODAY FOR AUDATEX? 17 MR. MCPHIE: YOUR HONOR, JUST ONE THAT WE OUGHT TO 18 19 ADDRESS FOR FINALIZING THE DEPOSITION SCHEDULE. AND THIS GOES BACK TO THE ISSUE OF INDIVIDUAL VERSUS CORPORATE DEPOSITIONS. 20 21 THE DATES PROVIDED IN MITCHELL'S OPPOSITION DID PROVIDE DATES FOR TWO 30(B)(6) DATES. ONE 30(B)(6) DATE DIRECTED TO FOUR 22 TOPICS, AND ANOTHER 30(B)(6) DATE RELATING TO ALL THE OTHER 23 TOPICS IN THE 30(B)(6) NOTICE. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED DATES FOR 24 25 INDIVIDUAL DEPOSITIONS FOR TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN

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DESIGNATED AS THE 30(B)(6) WITNESSES ON THOSE TWO TOPICS.
1
              THE COURT: YOU DIDN'T LIST THEM EITHER, DID YOU? I
2
    DIDN'T SEE THAT THERE WERE -- WAS A DISPUTE.
3
             MR. MCPHIE: I WAS UNCLEAR. I KNOW YOUR HONOR
4
    MENTIONED THAT WE HAD PROVIDED A LIST IN OUR INITIAL BRIEF. I
5
    WASN'T CLEAR WHAT THAT WAS.
6
             THE COURT: SO MITCHELL'S IS ON PAGE 12 OR THE ECF
7
    PAGE 15.
8
9
             MR. WHITE: RIGHT. WE ACTUALLY -- SO WHEN WE SAW
    THIS CHART, WE ACTUALLY PREPARED OURSELVES FOR PURPOSES OF
10
    TODAY OUR --
11
              THE COURT: SO I HAVE YOURS ON PAGE 6 OR ECF PAGE 9.
12
    THAT IS WHERE I CAME UP WITH THESE TWO.
13
             MR. WHITE: SO THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. SO THOSE
14
    DATES WERE PROVIDED SINCE THE TIME WE FILED. THE QUESTION HAS
15
    COME UP RELATED TO THE 30(B)(6) DEPOSITIONS, AS THEY RELATE TO
16
    THE PERSONAL DEPOSITIONS.
17
              THE COURT: FOR WHOM? WHO ARE THE 30(B)(6)?
18
              MR. WHITE: SO FOR JANUARY 30TH, JESSE HERERRA, THAT
19
    IS TOMORROW. WE HAVE NOTICED THAT AS A 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION ON
20
21
    THE BULK OF THE TOPICS. AND ON FEBRUARY 6TH, MR. DAY HAS BEEN
    DESIGNATED ON FOUR FINANCIAL TOPICS. THAT'S HOW THOSE
22
    DEPOSITIONS HAVE BEEN NOTICED. THAT'S WHAT WE'RE PLANNING ON
23
    GOING FORWARD ON. THE QUESTION THEN IS, AS TO THESE REQUESTED
24
25
    DATES FOR MR. HERERRA AND MR. DAY, TO BE DEPOSED IN PERSONAL
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ASPECTS.
1
              THE COURT: DID YOU NOTICE THOSE DEPOSITIONS?
2
              MR. WHITE: YES. THEY HAVE BEEN NOTICED.
 3
              THE COURT: FOR WHEN?
 4
              MR. WHITE: THEY WERE ALWAYS DONE SEPARATELY.
 5
              THE COURT: FOR WHEN? WHEN WERE THEY NOTICED FOR?
 6
              MR. WHITE: THE ORIGINAL DEPOSITIONS WERE NOTICED
7
    BACK IN DECEMBER. WE NOTICED NEW DATES, I BELIEVE, IN
8
9
    FEBRUARY.
              THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHEN ARE THEY --
10
              MR. WHITE: THE 12TH AND THE 13TH.
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              MR. MCPHIE: SO WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THEM RUN IN
12
    CONJUNCTION WITH THE 30(B)(6) TOPICS, SO THERE IS NOT A LOT OF
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14
    TIME LEFT IN THIS CASE. AND TO HAVE THESE INDIVIDUALS DEPOSED
    TWICE, WHEN I REALLY DON'T KNOW WHAT THE DIFFERENT TESTIMONY IS
15
    GOING TO BE IN THE PERSONAL CAPACITY, VERSUS THE 30(B)(6).
16
              THE COURT: OH, I THINK WE JUST SAW THAT BY READING
17
    THE DEPOSITION.
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              MR. MCPHIE: I UNDERSTAND. BUT WE AGREED WITH THEIR
    30(B)(6) WITNESS, TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION SIMULTANEOUS WITH
20
    PERSONAL AND 30(B)(6) AT THE SAME TIME.
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22
              THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT MOST PEOPLE DO. AND I WAS
    SURPRISED THAT THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE.
23
              MR. MCPHIE: THAT'S WHAT WE THINK SHOULD HAPPEN. AND
24
    GIVEN THE TIME TO FIND ADDITIONAL DAYS FOR THESE TWO WITNESSES,
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I THINK --1 THE COURT: CAN YOU DO 30(B)(6) IN THE MORNING, AND 2 THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE AFTERNOON? HOW LONG ARE THESE DEPOS? 3 MR. WHITE: THE 30(B)(6) WILL BE PRETTY EXTENSIVE 4 JUST AS IT WAS FOR THE 30(B)(6) AUDATEX. I HAVE A PROPOSAL 5 THAT MAYBE GETS US HALFWAY. 6 THE COURT: WHAT IS THAT? 7 MR. MCPHIE: FOR MR. DAY, IT IS JUST FOUR TOPICS. I 8 9 DO THINK THAT FOR MR. DAY, WE CAN COMPLETE HIM IN A SINGLE DAY AND DO IT AT THE SAME TIME. MR. HERERRA PRESENTS MORE OF A 10 DIFFICULTY. HIS DEPOSITION IS SUPPOSED TO GO FORWARD TOMORROW 11 AS A DESIGNEE. HE HASN'T BEEN PREPARED -- OR WE HAVE NOT 12 PREPARED TO TAKE THAT DEPOSITION IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY FOR 13 14 PRECISELY THE REASONS THAT WE HAVE HEARD EARLIER, THAT MITCHELL WANTED TO KEEP THESE THINGS SEPARATE. SO WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT 15 MR. HERERRA GO FORWARD IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY ON FEBRUARY 12TH 16 OR 13TH. 17 THE COURT: IS HE AVAILABLE? 18 19 MR. MCPHIE: WE DON'T KNOW. WE HAVE TO ASK. BUT I WOULD SUGGEST -- HE'S SENIOR MANAGEMENT IN OUR COMPANY, AND TO 20 21 HAVE HIM SIT THROUGH TWO FULL DAYS OF DEPOSITION, WE DON'T THINK IS APPROPRIATE. 22 THE COURT: THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO THAT. THEY 23 HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A PERSONAL DEPOSITION AND A -- YOU KNOW, 24 25 YOU CHOSE HIM AS THE 30(B)(6) FOR THESE TOPICS.

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MR. WHITE: WELL, THEN I WOULD LIKE THE PERSONAL
DEPOSITION AND THE 30(B)(6) -- I'LL TRY AND COMPLETE IT ALL IN
ONE DAY. WE STOPPED AT SEVEN HOURS, AND WE'D LIKE SOME
ADDITIONAL TIME WITH THAT WITNESS. IF WE'RE NOT GOING TO AGREE
TO DO SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR EFFICIENCY, WE'D LIKE TO TAKE THE
DEPOSITION IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY AS WELL.
         THE COURT: HAVEN'T YOU ALREADY TAKEN THAT? THAT IS
WHAT I JUST --
         MR. WHITE: WE DID, AND SO THE POINT WAS, IS WE -- I
AGREED TO DO THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE'D ASKED IN ADVANCE FOR
ADDITIONAL TIME. GIVEN THAT SHE'S THE DESIGNEE FOR 40-PLUS
TOPICS, AND WE WERE GOING TO RUN PERSONAL SIMULTANEOUS WITH
THAT, WE'RE TRYING TO DO IT EFFICIENTLY. SO IF THEY AGREE TO
GO SIMULTANEOUS. BUT WE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO
GET TO ALL THE ISSUES, SO WE WOULD REQUEST THAT WE HAVE
ADDITIONAL TIME WITH HER AS WELL.
         MR. MCPHIE: YOUR HONOR, THAT WAS MITCHELL'S CHOICE.
WE MADE IT VERY CLEAR, WE SAID, LOOK, IF YOU WANT THE
CONVENIENCE TO DO PERSONAL TOPICS AND THE CORPORATE TOPICS IN
THE SINGLE DEPOSITION, YOU'RE WELCOME TO DO THAT IN ONE DAY.
THAT IS YOUR CHOICE. BUT UNDERSTAND THAT WE'RE NOT GOING TO
GIVE YOU ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 30(B)(6) TOPICS. WE'RE NOT
GOING TO RAISE OBJECTIONS DURING THE DEPOSITION. YOU CAN ASK
PERSONAL TOPICS, CORPORATE TOPICS. WE MADE THAT VERY CLEAR IN
ADVANCE.
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THE COURT: YEAH, I'M GOING TO -- I'M NOT GOING TO
REOPEN THAT DEPOSITION. I WILL SAY, I FIND IT VERY
DISAPPOINTING THAT THIS IS HOW COUNSEL IS CHOOSING TO PROCEED
FORWARD ON THESE. BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THE LAW REQUIRES --
ALLOWS THEM TO DO THIS.
    SO I'M GOING TO REQUIRE MR. DAY'S DEPOSITION, BOTH THE
30(B)(6) AND THE INDIVIDUAL, TO OCCUR WITHIN THE SEVEN HOURS ON
FEBRUARY 6TH. THEY CAN BE IN THE -- YOU CAN DO 30(B)(6) IN THE
MORNING, INDIVIDUAL IN THE AFTERNOON, OR YOU CAN DO ONE DAY
WITH BOTH TOPICS. I DON'T CARE HOW YOU DO IT. BUT IT'S GOING
TO HAPPEN ON FEBRUARY 6 IN SEVEN HOURS.
    ON MR. HERERRA, I'M GOING TO ALLOW YOU A SECOND DAY.
BECAUSE IF HE'S PREPARED AND READY TO GO ON THE 30TH, IT MAY
MAKE SENSE IF HE'S AVAILABLE, TO THEN DEPOSE HIM ON THE 2ND OR
3RD OF FEBRUARY, DEPENDING ON HIS AVAILABILITY. I'M NOT GOING
TO REQUIRE IT TO BE AT THE END. WE'RE GOING TO DO IT BASED ON
HIS AVAILABILITY. WE NEED TO GET THESE DEPOSITIONS DONE.
         MR. MCPHIE: CAN WE HAVE SOME SORT OF LIMIT ON THAT?
I MEAN, I JUST THINK THAT IS -- WHAT IS FAIR IS FAIR, RIGHT. I
MEAN, IT DOESN'T SEEM RIGHT TO IMPOSE THE LIMIT ON US, WHEN
WE'RE TRYING TO DO THINGS EFFICIENTLY, AND THEN HAVE THEM HAVE
TWO FULL DAYS WITH A VERY SENIOR PERSON.
          THE COURT: DID YOU REACH ANY SORT OF AGREEMENT WITH
THEM? THAT'S THE PROBLEM I HAVE.
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MR. MCPHIE: WE DID IN ADVANCE. WE REQUESTED

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ADDITIONAL TIME, AND THEN THEY SAID -- THE RESPONSE WAS, WE
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    DEFINITELY SIGNED THIS ISSUE UPFRONT.
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              MR. WHITE: AND WHICH WE DID THINGS EFFICIENTLY.
3
              THE COURT: WELL, ON BOTH SIDES, THIS HAS NOT BEEN
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    EFFICIENT. I'M JUST RULING ON A MOTION FOR THE THIRD TIME WITH
5
    YOU GUYS. SO I'M NOT PERSUADED BY THIS EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT.
6
    WE'RE JUST AT THE END OF DISCOVERY.
7
         HOW LONG DO YOU NEED TO DEPOSE HIM? IT DOESN'T SEEM IT
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9
    SHOULD TAKE 14 HOURS.
              MR. WHITE: I DON'T THINK SO, YOUR HONOR. I MEAN, IF
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    WE HAVE HALF DAYS AND --
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              THE COURT: SOME TIME ON THE INDIVIDUAL?
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              MR. WHITE: ON THE INDIVIDUAL, YES.
              THE COURT: SO LET'S DO THAT. THE 30(B)(6) WILL BE
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    SEVERAL HOURS. THE INDIVIDUAL WILL BE THREE HOURS. AND IF YOU
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    CAN DO IT ON FEBRUARY 2ND OR 3RD, THAT WOULD BE -- IF HE CAN DO
16
    IT --
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              MR. MCPHIE: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO HAVE TO CHECK.
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19
              THE COURT: THAT WOULD BE IDEAL FOR HIM, I WOULD
    THINK, PREPARE ONCE, GET IT OVER WITH.
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21
              MR. MCPHIE: THE SCHEDULING HERE, WE'LL HAVE TO GET
    BACK AND SEE WHAT THAT IS IN TERMS OF AVAILABILITY.
22
              THE COURT: TALK TO EACH OTHER. CALL THESE PEOPLE.
23
    GET THIS WORKED OUT. GET THIS CASE, GET THE DISCOVERY DONE,
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    AND WE'LL MOVE ON. ALL RIGHT.
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MR. MCPHIE: THE ONLY OTHER ISSUE WE DIDN'T TALK
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    ABOUT IS MR. YORKS' DEPOSITION, THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. THE
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    FIRST ISSUE YOU TOOK UP TODAY WAS ORDERING THAT DEPOSITION.
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              THE COURT: RIGHT.
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              MR. MCPHIE: WE NEED TO GET THAT DONE, I ASSUME, IN
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    THE SAME TIME FRAME?
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              THE COURT: YES, SAME THING. THAT DEPOSITION HAS TO
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    OCCUR BY -- WHAT DATE DID I USE?
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              MR. MCPHIE: THE 16TH.
              THE COURT: IT HAS TO BE DONE BY THE 16TH.
10
              MR. WHITE: THAT WILL BE VERY SIMPLE, YOUR HONOR.
11
    GIVEN HOW LIMITED IT IS, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE CARE OF
12
    THAT.
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14
              THE COURT: PERFECT. THANK YOU, COUNSEL.
              MR. WHITE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
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              MR. MCPHIE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
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                         (RECESS AT 11:21 A.M.)
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C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-I-O-NI HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A DULY APPOINTED, QUALIFIED AND ACTING OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT; THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CAUSE; THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF MY STENOGRAPHIC NOTES; AND THAT THE FORMAT USED HEREIN COMPLIES WITH THE RULES AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE. DATED: FEBRUARY 2, 2015, AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA S/DEBORAH M. O'CONNELL, CSR #10563 REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER